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NOTHING LEFT TO TAX OR CUT, THE GATE TO 
CHAPTER 9 IS SHUT:1 
THE PUERTO RICO DEBT CRISIS 
Bianca Ko* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is more than $73 billion in 
debt, and United States citizens on the island are suffering.2 Puerto 
Rico has a 45% poverty rate, and its biggest public pension is over 
99% underfunded.3 Although its unemployment rate has dipped, the 
decline is mainly due to Puerto Ricans traveling to mainland United 
States to look for jobs or dropping out of the workforce altogether.4 
As of 2015, sales taxes were higher in Puerto Rico than any other U.S. 
state or territory.5 Moreover, schools and hospitals in Puerto Rico have 
suffered as a result of this financial crisis, as the crisis has led to cutoffs 
of power and water, leading to closures of various facilities.6 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Physics, Columbia 
University in the City of New York, 2014. Thanks to Professor Anne Wells, to Alisa Lalana for her 
invaluable feedback, to Professor Aimee Dudovitz for her unrelenting encouragement throughout 
the writing process, to the members of Loyola of Los Angles Law Review for their hard work, and 
to family and friends for their support. 
 1.  Star and creator of the Broadway musical Hamilton Lin-Manuel Miranda performed a rap 
with the lyric “Nothing left to tax or cut” in LastWeekTonight. Puerto Rico: Last Week Tonight 
with John Oliver, YOUTUBE (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tt-mpuR_QHQ. 
 2. Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Puerto Rico Debt-Relief Options, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 
4, 2015, 2:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/court-to-rule-on-puerto-rico-debt-relief-
options. 
 3. Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Authorizes Debt Payment Suspension; Obama Signs Rescue Bill, 
REUTERS (June 30, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-idUSKCN0ZG09Y. 
“Promesa” is the Spanish word for “promise.” 
 4. About 80,000 people left Puerto Rico between 2014 and 2015. Brian Chappatta, Puerto 
Rico Economy Worsens with Crisis, Most Anywhere You Look, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Apr. 25, 
2016, 2:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-04-25/puerto-rico-economy-
worsens-with-crisis-most-anywhere-you-look. 
 5. Scott Beyer, Puerto Rico, at 11.5%, Has America’s Highest Sales Tax, FORBES (Aug. 17, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2015/08/17/puerto-rico-at-11-5-has-americas-high 
est-sales-tax/#85c633254245. 
 6. See generally, Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Fiasco Is a Harbinger of 
Mainland Woes, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/business/ 
dealbook/puerto-ricos-fiscal-fiasco-is-harbinger-of-mainland-woes.html. 
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Under Chapter 9, the United States Bankruptcy Code allows 
almost any territory to file for bankruptcy relief to restructure its 
debts.7 In such a scenario, the government’s municipality, or “political 
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State,”8 would file 
a voluntary petition.9 Then, the municipal debtor would file a list of 
creditors.10 There would be an automatic stay, which would stop 
collection actions against the debtor and its property.11 After 
negotiating with its creditors, the municipal debtor would write a plan 
with debt adjustments and an outline of its future spending.12 The 
bankruptcy court to which the case is assigned would confirm the 
plan.13 After the plan is carried out, the municipal debtor would 
receive a discharge, which relieves it of its debt.14 
Unfortunately, Puerto Rico does not have this safety net. In 1984, 
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to exclude the municipalities 
of Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia from bankruptcy 
eligibility.15 Unable to restructure under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
Puerto Rican legislature designed and passed its own restructuring 
plan.16 In response, Puerto Rico’s creditors filed suit, alleging that, 
although Puerto Rico is excluded for the purposes of the definition of 
debtor in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) pre-
empts the restructuring plan.17 
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust18 asked the 
Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether Puerto Rico 
may pass its own Recovery Act to restructure its own debts.19 The 
Supreme Court answered this question by examining three provisions 
 
 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012). 
 9. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012). A “voluntary petition” is in contrast with an “involuntary 
petition,” where, in bankruptcies under Chapters 7 or 11, three creditors may file an involuntary 
petition for a debtor. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). 
 10. 11 U.S.C. § 924 (2012). 
 11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 901(a) (2012). 
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012). 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 943 (2012). 
 14. 11 U.S.C. § 944 (2012). 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012). 
 16. Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (“Recovery Act”), 
2014 P.R. LAWS 71, invalidated by Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 
(2016). 
 17. Amended Complaint at 11, Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 85 F. Supp. 3d 
577 (2015) (No. 14-1518). 
 18. 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). 
 19. See id. at 1943. 
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in Title 11 (Bankruptcy) of the United States Code: the gateway 
provision,20 the pre-emption provision,21 and the provision that defines 
the term “States.”22 In a 5-2 decision, the Court held that Puerto Rico 
is a “State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision,23 stopping 
Puerto Rican municipalities from being able to file for bankruptcy.24 
Part II of this Comment examines the background of Franklin, 
with emphasis on some of Congress’s tax policies and their historical 
effect on Puerto Rico’s economy, providing explanations for Puerto 
Rico’s bankruptcy. Part III discusses the Court’s reasoning in 
Franklin, in both the majority opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent. Part IV explains the aftermath of the decision, including other 
efforts to provide relief to Puerto Rico. Part V ties in the Franklin 
decision with Puerto Rico’s sovereignty and the purpose of 
bankruptcy law, and it argues for another look at the statute in context. 
Finally, Part VI provides a summary of the arguments put forward in 
this paper. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Jones-Shafroth 
Act.25 It granted birthright U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans and stated 
that Puerto Rico was a U.S. territory.26 In addition, it gave triple tax 
exemptions27 from bonds issued by the Puerto Rican government, 
 
 20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)(2012): “An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and 
only if such entity is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor under such chapter by State law.” 
The Court dubs this statute the “gateway provision” because any municipality that does not fall 
under this category is not eligible for Chapter 9 relief. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 
1941. 
 21. 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2012): “[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of 
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such 
composition . . . .” This statute is the “pre-emption provision” because it bars any state from pre-
empting the Bankruptcy Code. 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012): “The term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.” 
 23. 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2012). 
 24. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1948–49. Justice Alito withdrew himself from 
the case; rumors indicate that he has personal interests as a result of his investments. Lyle 
Denniston, Argument Analysis: If Only Congress Had Taken the Time to Explain, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Mar. 22, 2016, 3:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/argument-analysis-if-only-
congress-had-taken-the-time-to-explain. 
 25. Jones-Shafroth (Jones) Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-348, 39 Stat. 951. 
 26. Id. at 953. 
 27. Transactions involving Puerto Rican bonds are exempt from federal, state and local taxes. 
Id. 
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regardless of the bond holder’s residence.28 Moreover, the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico states that public 
debt is paid before any other government spending.29 In summary, 
Puerto Rican bonds were a tax-free, low-risk investment with a fixed 
interest. Naturally, these bonds attracted many investors. 
In 1976, Congress enacted a law exempting United States 
corporations in Puerto Rico from federal taxes.30 As a result, Puerto 
Rico became a United States multinational tax haven, especially for 
pharmaceutical companies.31 However, starting in 1996, Congress 
incrementally rolled back these tax breaks to offset some debt in 
mainland United States, and by 2006, the tax breaks were completely 
removed.32 
Consequently, companies started to leave Puerto Rico, which hit 
recession as people followed their jobs off the island and tax revenue 
went down.33 Municipalities in Puerto Rico began to accumulate a lot 
of debt; by 2015, accumulative debt totaled more than $72 billion.34 
As tax revenues were low and Puerto Rico had no other means of 
earning money, the Puerto Rican government turned back to selling 
bonds—this time, to anyone who would buy them.35 The surge in sales 
downgraded the bonds to junk status.36 In 2015, Puerto Rican governor 
 
 28. Id. Bonds are an investment bought from the government: someone becomes a bond holder 
by buying the bonds and the government owes money to its bond holders on an interest, which it 
repays after a certain period. Investor Resources: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, GOV’T DEV. 
BANK FOR P.R., http://www.gdbpr.com/investors_resources/commonwealth.html (last visited July 
31, 2016). 
 29. Jones-Shafroth (Jones) Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-348, 39 Stat. 951, 963. 
 30. 26 U.S.C. § 936 (2012). 
 31. Ezra Fieser, The Town Viagra Built Tries to Move On, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-19/the-town-viagra-built-tries-to-move-on. In 
fact, because Pfizer once produced Viagra there, the mayor of Barceloneta once bragged that 
“[w]e’re responsible for a lot of good moments.” Id. 
 32. Mary Williams Walsh & Liz Moyer, How Puerto Rico Debt is Grappling with a Debt 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/dealbook/ 
puerto-rico-debt-crisis-explained.html. 
 33. Id.; see Jens Manuel Krogstad, Puerto Ricans Leave in Record Numbers for Mainland 
U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/14/puerto-
ricans-leave-in-record-numbers-for-mainland-u-s/, for detailed analysis of Puerto Rican 
expatriation numbers. 
 34. Walsh & Moyer, supra note 32. 
 35. A former governor of Puerto Rico compared this situation to a drug addiction. Puerto 
Rico: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, supra note 1. 
 36. Id. 
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Alejandro Garcia Padilla formally announced that Puerto Rico could 
not pay its debt.37 
The United States Bankruptcy Code provides that municipalities 
in Puerto Rico cannot file Chapter 9 bankruptcy, as Puerto Rico lacks 
the power to determine whether a municipality can be a debtor under 
Chapter 9.38 If Puerto Rican municipalities could file Chapter 9 
bankruptcy, then the process would have directly provided relief for 
about $20 billion of Puerto Rico’s debt.39 Without the ability to file 
for bankruptcy under existing federal law, Puerto Rico opted to enact 
the Recovery Act.40 The Recovery Act allows Puerto Rico’s 
municipalities to negotiate debt with its creditors,41 much like a debtor 
would in case of bankruptcy.42 These municipalities include the 
Electric Power Authority (PREPA), the Aqueduct and Sewer 
Authority (PRASA), and the Highways and Transport Authority 
(PRHTA).43 
In part because of the urgency of the issue,44 other government 
officials are also attempting to address this problem. As of the date of 
this writing, President Obama has signed, and members of Congress 
are hoping to pass, the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and 
Economic Stability Act (hereinafter “Promesa”).45 Promesa is a bill 
that temporarily bars Puerto Rico’s creditors from suing it for 
payment46 and allows Puerto Rico to enter district court-supervised 
 
 37. He said, “This is not politics, this is math.” Michael Corkery & Mary Williams Welsh, 
Puerto Rico’s Governor Says Island’s Debts Are ‘Not Payable’, N.Y. TIMES, (June 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/business/dealbook/puerto-ricos-governor-says-islands-debts 
-are-not-payable.html. 
 38. 11 U.S.C. 101(52) (2012). 
 39. Greg Stohr & Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Debt Law Struck Down, Leaving Congress in 
Charge, BLOOMBERG POL. (June 13, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-06-
13/puerto-rico-debt-restructuring-law-voided-by-u-s-supreme-court. 
 40. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1942–43. 
 41. 2014 P.R. LAWS 71, section 318(b). 
 42. In fact, this is very similar to a Chapter 9 bankruptcy. See Chapter 9–Bankruptcy Basics, 
U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-9-
bankruptcy-basics (last visited Aug. 29, 2016). 
 43. 2014 P.R. LAWS 71, section A. 
 44. Puerto Rico missed a payment on May 1, 2016, before the Supreme Court opinion was 
even handed down. Michelle Kaske, Jonathan Levin & Brian Chappatta, Puerto Rico Warns of 
More Defaults After Missing May Payment, BLOOMBERG, (May 1, 2016), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2016-05-01/puerto-rico-will-default-on-government-development-bank-debt. 
 45. Brown, supra note 3. “Promesa” is the Spanish word for “promise.” 
 46. This mechanism is used in nearly all bankruptcy cases, and is termed an “automatic stay.” 
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
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debt restructuring.47 It includes measures such as cuts in Puerto Rico’s 
healthcare and education systems as well as government agencies.48 
Most notably, it cuts the minimum wage for youths under 25 to $4.25 
an hour.49 Unsurprisingly, many Puerto Ricans have expressed 
concerns about this bill.50 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust51 
(Franklin), with a 5-2 decision, the majority opinion, written by 
Justice Clarence Thomas, ruled that Puerto Rico was barred from 
enacting the Recovery Act.52 The dissent was written by Justice 
Sotomayor and joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Alito excused 
himself from the case.53 
The case addresses whether Puerto Rico may pass its own law 
permitting its municipalities to file for bankruptcy. The Court did this 
by looking at three different statutes.54 Despite the structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the obvious practical considerations, the Court 
held that the plain language of the statutes forbade Puerto Rico from 
enacting the law.55 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
The Court’s opinion indicates that the Code pre-empted Puerto 
Rico’s bankruptcy plan.56 Justice Thomas begins the opinion by 
stating that, although the Constitution allows Congress to “establish 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States,”57 Congress’s bankruptcy laws may have “infringed the States’ 
 
 47. H.R. 5278, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016). The Court in Franklin notes that Congress is 
proposing to add a chapter to Title 48, governing the Territories, rather than amending the 
Bankruptcy Code. 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 n. 1 (2016). 
 48. H.R. 5278, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016). 
 49. Juan C. Dávila, PROMESA: Puerto Rico’s “Restructure” at $4.25 an Hour, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/juan-c-davila/promesa-
puerto-ricos-rest_b_10615610.html. 
 50. E.g., Lin-Manuel Miranda, Making Lemonade from Lemons, EL DIARIO (May 31, 2016), 
http://www.eldiariony.com/2016/05/31/making-lemonade-from-lemons. 
 51. 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). 
 52. Id. at 1940–41. 
 53. Id. at 1941. 
 54. See supra notes 19–21. 
 55. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 56. Id. at 1946. 
 57. Id. at 1944 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 
181, 184 (1902)). 
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powers to ‘manage their own affairs.’”58 He points out that Congress’s 
federal municipal bankruptcy laws preserve “the States’ reserved 
powers over their municipalities.”59 Justice Thomas then defends his 
method of interpretation by asserting that the language of the statutes 
is plain.60 
Justice Thomas first focuses on the “express pre-emption clause” 
of the gateway provision and points out that its purpose was to “pre-
empt[] state municipal bankruptcy laws.”61 He notes that the 
Bankruptcy Code includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico 
as States “except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor 
under [C]hapter 9.”62 He declares that the exception “unmistakably 
refers to the gateway provision.”63 Thus, Puerto Rico’s municipalities 
“cannot satisfy the requirements of Chapter 9’s gateway provision.”64 
Then, the Court turns to the “gateway provision,” which 
determines who may be a debtor under Chapter 9.65 It states that a 
Chapter 9 debtor “is a municipality [and] is specifically authorized . . . 
to be a debtor under such chapter by State law.”66 In other words, if 
Puerto Rico is a “State” under this definition, PREPA, PRASA, and 
PRHTA must all obtain Puerto Rico’s permission before they file for 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy.67 However, the Court holds that the amended 
definition supplied by the pre-emption clause excludes Puerto Rico 
from the definition of “State” here.68 As previously stated, the Code 
specifies that Puerto Rico is “not a State … for the purposes of defining 
who may be a debtor.”69 Justice Thomas writes that to “define” is “to 
decide upon,”70 or “to establish or prescribe authoritatively.”71 As 
 
 58. Id. (citing Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 531 
(1936)). 
 59. Id. at 1944. 
 60. Id. at 1947. 
 61. Id. at 1946 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012)). See supra note 21. 
 62. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012)) (emphasis in opinion). See supra note 22. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1946–47. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1947 (citing define, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 383 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 71. Id. (citing define, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 380 (5th ed. 1979)). 
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such, Puerto Rico cannot “specifically authorize which municipalities 
may file Chapter 9 petitions.”72 
Finally, the Court grapples with the pre-emption provision, which 
bars States from enacting municipal bankruptcy laws.73 Congress has 
prohibited States and Territories defined as “States” from enacting 
their own municipal bankruptcy schemes for 70 years.74 The 
Bankruptcy Code should not impede on “the political or governmental 
powers of [a] municipality, including expenditures,” but “a State law 
prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such 
municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such 
composition.”75 
Justice Thomas then argues that the structure of the Bankruptcy 
Code needs not be taken into account.76 First, he argues that the 
gateway provision determines whether the debtors themselves—in 
this case, the municipalities, and not the State—can file for 
bankruptcy.77 The pre-emption provision ensures that any State that 
chooses not to authorize its municipalities to file for bankruptcy 
cannot enact its own municipal bankruptcy scheme.78 Even though the 
Code prohibits Puerto Rico from authorizing municipalities to seek 
Chapter 9 relief, Justice Thomas believes that Congress would have 
expressly excluded Puerto Rico as a “State” for purposes of the pre-
emption provision if it had meant to do so.79 
Moreover, Justice Thomas acknowledges that this decision left 
Puerto Rico with no choice but to wait for congressional action to avert 
further crises.80 However, this reality does not allow the Court to 
redraft Congress’s legislation.81 
B.  The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, authored the 
dissent.82 Justice Sotomayor argues that the Bankruptcy Code should 
 
 72. Id. (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2012)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (citing 60 Stat. 415). 
 75. 11 U.S.C. § 903(1). 
 76. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1947–49. 
 77. Id. at 1947. 
 78. Id. at 1948. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1949. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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be read in context: for instance, what applies to a Chapter 9 plan (for 
municipalities) should not be read to apply to any plan filed under 
Chapter 13 (restructuring).83 Therefore, when Justices Sotomayor and 
Ginsburg look at the purpose that the pre-emption provision serves, 
they find no reason that the word “States” should apply to Puerto 
Rico.84 
Justice Sotomayor argues that the purpose of the pre-emption 
provision is to “delineate the balance of power between the States that 
can authorize their municipalities to access Chapter 9 protection and 
the bankruptcy court that would preside over any municipal 
bankruptcy commenced under Chapter 9.”85 In other words, the pre-
emption provision ensures that any State with the power to grant 
Chapter 9 protection to its municipality may not decline to do so in 
favor of some other bankruptcy mechanism. The statute is a restriction 
of the States’ power to invoke municipal bankruptcy.86 The dissent 
thus argues that this restriction of power does not apply to Puerto Rico 
because Puerto Rico does not have the power to invoke Chapter 9 
protection.87 
In defense of this conclusion, Justice Sotomayor points to the 
structure of the Bankruptcy Code.88 She argues that the Bankruptcy 
Code sets out a formal structure; for example, “Chapter 1 is the starting 
point. It sets out how to read the Code” by setting out what kind of 
debtors should look at which chapters.89 The dissent argues that the 
gateway provision excludes Puerto Rico from Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
for all purposes.90 
Finally, the dissent embraces practicality, as without the plan, 
Puerto Rico had no choice but to rely on Congress to construct and 
pass a bankruptcy plan that could save it.91 From an equitable 
standpoint, the dissent argues that “[s]tatutes should not easily be read 
as removing the power of a government to protect its citizens.”92 
 
 83. Id. at 1951. 
 84. Id. at 1953. 
 85. Id. at 1952. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1951–52. 
 89. Id. at 1951. 
 90. Id. at 1953. 
 91. Id. at 1954. 
 92. Id. 
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IV.  IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PUERTO RICO V. CALIFORNIA 
FRANKLIN TAX-FREE TRUST 
It is important to acknowledge that the outcome of this case is 
counterintuitive.93 After all, it is difficult to believe that the Court 
would make a decision leaving United States citizens “unable to pay 
for things like fuel to generate electricity, which will lead to rolling 
blackouts.”94 To be sure, some commentators have said that Puerto 
Rico drowns in debt out of its own making.95 However, this does not 
mean at all that Puerto Ricans should continue to endure this crisis any 
more than they have to. 
The immediate effect of Franklin is that Puerto Rico was left to 
rely on Congress and President Obama for a way out.96 On June 30, 
2016, President Obama signed Promesa.97 Promesa gives authority to 
a fiscal oversight board (the “Board”) to oversee Puerto Rico’s 
finances.98 The Board will primarily develop and approve budgets for 
Puerto Rico and its many municipalities.99 It will also approve 
voluntary debt restructurings for Puerto Rico and its municipalities, or 
use the federal district court system to impose restructurings where the 
parties are unable to agree.100 
In addition, much like any other bankruptcy law, Promesa 
provides an automatic stay of all litigation against Puerto Rico and its 
municipalities.101 It also proposes to lower the minimum wage for 
 
 93. As one commentator wrote, “[y]our profligate uncle can obtain relief through bankruptcy, 
but the people of Puerto Rico must suffer.” Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Rules Against Puerto 
Rican Bankruptcy, THINKPROGRESS (June 13, 2016, 12:08 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/ 
2016/06/13/3787665/supreme-court-puerto-rico-youre-screwed/. See Ted Folkman, Case of the 
Day: Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, LETTERS BLOGATORY (June 21, 2016), 
https://lettersblogatory.com/2016/06/21/case-day-puerto-rico-v-franklin-california-tax-free-trust/. 
 94. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1950 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 95. Scott Shackford, It’s Not Hedge Funds That Caused Puerto Rico to Fail to Manage Its 
Debts, REASON.COM (May 3, 2016, 1:35 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2016/05/03/its-not-hedge-
funds-that-caused-puerto-r. 
 96. Greg Stohr & Michele Kaske, Puerto Rico Debt Law Struck Down, Leaving Congress in 
Charge, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2016, 4:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/ 
2016-06-13/puerto-rico-debt-restructuring-law-voided-by-u-s-supreme-court. 
 97. Brown, supra note 3. 
 98. Stephen Selbst, Puerto Rico Financial Oversight Law Enacted, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 
11, 2016), http://www.bna.com/puerto-rico-financial-n73014446226/. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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workers under the age of 25 years to only $4.25 per hour for up to four 
years.102 
Promesa is actually very similar to a Chapter 9 bankruptcy.103 
Members of Congress have decided to draft and enact a separate law 
for Puerto Rico to file bankruptcy in district court rather than simply 
amend the Bankruptcy Code so that Puerto Rico can allow its own 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy like states do.104 One reason for 
this is politics: bondholders lobbied for Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy to 
be heard in district courts rather than bankruptcy courts, as they felt 
that bankruptcy courts were in favor of employee and pension 
claims.105 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Franklin is closely related to Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,106 
another case that was argued during the October Term of 2015. In a 6-
2 decision, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred 
Puerto Rico and the United States from successively prosecuting one 
person for the same conduct under equivalent criminal laws.107 
According to the Double Jeopardy Clause, two entities may bring 
successive prosecutions only if the entities derive their power to 
punish from independent sources.108 The majority reasoned that “the 
oldest roots of Puerto Rico’s power to prosecute lie in federal soil”: 
Puerto Rico’s authority to govern itself came from its Constitution, 
which in turn came from the U.S. Congress.109 Since Puerto Rico and 
the rest of the United States derived their power from the same source, 
Puerto Rico was barred by the Double Jeopardy clause from 
prosecuting someone whom the United States federal government had 
already prosecuted. The results of the two cases are consistent with 
one another: in both cases, the Court recognizes the special status of 
Puerto Rico, and restricts its power to govern itself. 
In the case of Franklin, the competing views of how statutes 
should be interpreted is not new; the Court has used both methods of 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016). 
 107. Id. at 1876. 
 108. Id. at 1871. 
 109. See id. at 1868, 1874–77. 
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interpretation—by its plain meaning and by incorporating statutory 
structure—in prior cases. While the majority, citing United States v. 
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,110 argues that the statute should be read on 
its plain meaning,111 the dissent, citing Utility Air Regulatory Group 
v. EPA,112 argues that the structure of the code should be taken account 
of as context.113 When the Court applies definitions so narrowly, it 
permits Congress to pick and choose when it controls Puerto Rico’s 
finances and when it does not. Perhaps more troublingly, the Court 
finds that Congress’s freedom of choice in this matter is completely 
logical. In oral arguments, when Puerto Rico municipalities pointed 
out that creditors’ interpretation of the pre-emption statute left no 
choice for Puerto Ricans but to appeal to Congress to change the law, 
Chief Justice Roberts asked why it would be irrational for Congress to 
want Puerto Rico to approach it for bankruptcy protection separately 
from Chapter 9.114 
One argument for Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation is in the pre-
emption provision itself, but in the first clause: “[t]his chapter does not 
limit or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or 
otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the 
political or governmental powers of such municipality, including 
expenditures for such exercise.”115 As a U.S. territory, Puerto Rico 
should be given the right to control its own municipalities and their 
expenditures.116 This clause of the statute is not violated by the 
bankruptcy filing of almost any other municipality because in the case 
of almost any other municipality bankruptcy, the municipality would 
still control its own finances.117 By denying Puerto Rico both the 
 
 110. 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
 111. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016) (Interpretation 
“begins ‘with the language of the statute itself,’ and that ‘is also where the inquiry should end,’ for 
‘the statute’s language is plain.’”). 
 112. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014). 
 113. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” (quoting FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000))). 
 114. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. 
Ct. 1938 (2016) (No. 15-233). 
 115. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
 116. See P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (allowing the Puerto Rico legislature to “create, abolish, 
consolidate, and reorganize municipalities . . . [and] to determine their organization and 
functions”). 
 117. See Chapter 9–Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 42 (“The provision makes it clear that the 
[municipality’s] day-to-day activities are not subject to court approval.” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 904 
(2012))). 
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power to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy and its power to enact its own 
bankruptcy laws, the Code would “impair the power of a State to 
control” its municipalities. 
Justice Thomas points out that States’ powers over their 
municipalities are not unlimited because the pre-emption provision 
was enacted after Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park118 in which 
the Court held that states could require their municipalities to file for 
bankruptcy under state law before resorting to federal bankruptcy 
schemes.119 However, this case can and should be distinguished from 
Faitoute because Congress likely enacted the pre-emption provision 
so that states would not enact their own bankruptcy schemes when a 
federal bankruptcy scheme was available. In this case, Puerto Rico’s 
alternative to a state bankruptcy scheme is no bankruptcy scheme, and 
it is difficult to imagine that Congress meant to leave Puerto Rico with 
no safety net. 
Another argument is that this decision defeats the principles of 
bankruptcy. It is often said that the bankruptcy court is a court of 
equity.120 “Equity” impresses upon the average person sentiments 
such as “fairness, justness, right dealing, inclusion, and flexibility.”121 
This was first held in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.122 However, bankruptcy 
judges have argued against this principle, writing instead that 
bankruptcy is a statutory practice.123 This is due to the fact that 
bankruptcy courts are limited to the power they are given by Congress 
through the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, one judge has written that the 
bankruptcy court is in the nice, cozy middle.124 
 
 118. 316 U.S. 502, 507–09 (1942). 
 119. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1944–45 (2016). 
 120. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934); see also Michael W. McConnell 
& Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 426 (1993) (describing the problem that bankruptcy is supposed to solve 
as a balance between a borrower’s ability to make “legally-enforceable promise to repay” and the 
importance of an accommodation where creditors get paid); but see, Alan M. Ahart, J., The Limited 
Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of 
Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2005). 
 121. See Marcia S. Krieger, J., The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity: What Does That 
Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 297 (1999); see also 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 363 (4th ed. 1918) (for a list of the maxims of equity). 
 122. 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934). 
 123. See, e.g., Ahart, supra note20; Krieger, supra note21, at 310. 
 124. See Krieger, supra note 121, at 310 (identifying the bankruptcy court as a “specialized 
court of limited jurisdiction applying statutory law that embodies a particular, often changing, 
social objective”). 
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Given that Puerto Ricans are in crisis, the Franklin decision 
seems hardly equitable at all. It is not unreasonable to ask why 
Congress amended this statute. One cannot ignore that there is no 
justification provided by Congress for why the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico have to wait for Congress to negotiate and pass a law 
on how they would conduct their bankruptcy proceedings.125 Promesa 
is almost identical to Chapter 9 bankruptcy, with the exception that it 
is overseen by a federal district court rather than a bankruptcy court.126 
There seems to be little reason for Puerto Rico to wait for Congress to 
appoint a fiscal oversight board that would effectively perform a 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding when it is in horrific crisis. 
Moreover, this threatens the underlying assumption that different 
courts administering the same law should yield similar results. 
There is no doubt that Chief Justice Roberts is correct in claiming 
Congress is free: (1) to determine that the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico should not be able to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, and 
(2) to exercise its control over the bankruptcy laws of these two places. 
However, if there are concerns that bankruptcy cases should be 
decided with principles of equity in mind, then perhaps the Court 
should take into account Congressional intent and the purpose of 
bankruptcy before assuming from the plain words of the statute that 
some U.S. citizens are simply stripped of their livelihoods through 
rolling blackouts, restricted access to water and transportation, high 
taxes, and a low minimum wage. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although the government of Puerto Rico is not entirely blameless 
in its financial crisis, it was Congress that passed many of the laws 
leading it there. Franklin is one case in the ongoing debate about the 
principles of bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court as a court of equity. 
The Court’s interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code is problematic as it 
is simply impractical. Bankruptcy should be a law that balances 
 
 125. “The only comment on excluding Puerto Rico from Chapter 9 came from Professor Frank 
Kennedy, former Executive Director of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, who said: ‘I do not 
understand why the municipal corporations of Puerto Rico are denied by the proposed definition of 
‘State’ of the right to seek relief under Chapter 9.’” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 
136 S. Ct. 1938, 1953 n.2 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Bankruptcy Improvements 
Act, Hearing on S. 333 et al. before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 
326 (1983)). 
 126. See supra Section II. 
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equitable and statutory doctrines, and the Court should not render a 
decision that delays help for millions of United States citizens. 
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